Risk-based Supervision of Banks Involved in Microfinance by Llanto, Gilberto M.





PIDS Policy Notes are observations/analyses written by PIDS
researchers on certain policy issues. The treatise is holistic in approach
and aims to provide useful inputs for decisionmaking.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily





*This Policy Notes focuses on the regulation of microfinance banks.
An earlier PIDS Policy Notes (No. 98-09) discussed the regulation of
deposit-taking cooperatives.
**The author is Vice-President of the Philippine Institute for Devel-
opment Studies.
1The term "microfinance" refers to the loans and savings facilities
provided by microfinance institutions to small-scale borrowers.
Microfinance institutions consist of rural banks, credit cooperatives, credit-
granting nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other banks provid-
ing microcredit.
". . . the only thing we require to be good philosophers
is the faculty of wonder. . ."
 Josten Gaarder, Sophie’s World
anks involved in microfinance or “microfinance
banks,” for short, are significantly different from
the traditional banks in terms of their clientele,
loan products, lending and collection technol-
ogy, and the associated risks surrounding their loan port-
folios, among others. Microfinance banks have shown a
remarkable ability to reach low-income clients, some of
whom are practically without bankable assets, and to col-
lect almost 100 percent of their loans. To be able to fur-
ther expand their reach to a wider clientele, these banks
need to raise funds from both deposits and commercial
sources. To be able to do this on a large scale, though,
they should be able to show to the public and the regula-
B
tory authority that they are as trustworthy as the regulated
nonmicrofinance bank.
But how should microfinance banks be regulated and
supervised? The quick answer as this Policy Notes shall
explain lies in adopting a risk-based regulation and super-
vision of microfinance banks that is more appropriate to
their nature and set-up than the conventional approach to
bank regulation and supervision.
In order to understand why this is so, it is first impor-
tant to understand the nature of the microfinance clientele
and of a microfinance loan.
Nature of the microfinance clientele
Microfinance loans are small loans granted to micro-
enterprises by financial intermediaries on the basis of the
borrower’s cash flow.1 These loans are typically unsecured
and charge market-determined interest rates, enabling2 January 2001
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microfinance institutions to cover operating
costs, cost of funds and various risks as
well as to generate profit margins.
A common characteristic of the
microfinance institutions' type of clientele
is their exclusion from the traditional bank-
ing system because of their perceived credit
risks, inability to provide loan collateral and,
generally, low incomes. Their failure to ac-
cess formal credit has given rise to a
plethora of government-directed credit programs that were
established to provide subsidized credit but which invari-
ably failed because of incentive incompatibility reasons.2
In this regard, credit-granting NGOs have recently emerged
as alternative sources of credit. In some instances, the
NGOs mobilize “savings” from their borrowers. The “sav-
ings” are really “forced savings” since these are retained
from the loans and kept by the NGO concerned to earn
interest for the borrower while at the same time being used
as some form of loan security.
Data from the 1998 Annual Poverty Indicators Sur-
vey (APIS) show why and how microfinance has become an
important source of liquidity, e.g., working capital, for
microenterprises. As shown in Table 1, poor families de-
rived income from multiple sources, mainly wages and sala-
ries, entrepreneurial activities and family sustenance ac-
tivities (for home consumption). Of the more than 14.4
million families surveyed, 67 percent received wage in-
come, 61 percent earned income from entrepreneurial ac-
tivities, and 50 percent engaged in family sustenance ac-
tivities to augment income. And among the poorest 40
percent of the respondents, more families (70%) depended
on entrepreneurial activities rather than on wages and sala-
ries (51%) for their income.
The multiplicity of income sources demonstrates how
low-income families try to cope with the challenge of daily
living since earnings from any one source are not enough
to cover living expenses. Families engaged in
microenterprises are especially constrained by the lack of
sufficient funds to expand their micro businesses or even
to sustain working capital requirements. Formal credit
seems to be difficult to avail of. In fact, the 1998 APIS
reports that out of 8.5 million surveyed families with busi-
nesses, only 25 percent were able to avail of credit to
finance their businesses (Table 2).
"Characterizing" a microfinance loan
Having seen the need for outside sources of funds
to fill the gap unserved by formal credit institutions, there
is a need to understand the nature of a microfinance loan.
Three elements are relevant in characterizing a microfinance
loan, namely: (a) size of the loan, (b) basis for determining
the borrower’s ability to repay the loan, and (c) interest
rates in microfinance operations.
Let us look into each of these in detail.
] Microfinance loans are small loans without tra-
ditional loan security. Microfinance loans are small loans
that are typically unsecured and given on the basis of infor-
mal information about the borrower, e.g., enjoys a good
reputation in the community. Documentation of a
microfinance loan is very simple since the clients do not
necessarily keep financial and other relevant records. How-
ever, to avoid potential abuse of the rules and regulations
that would expressly authorize microfinance banks to pro-
vide uncollateralized loans, the maximum amount of a
__________
2See Gilberto M. Llanto, Ma. Piedad Geron and Christine Tang
(1999) who concluded that the Philippine experience "provides ample
evidence that the implementation of directed credit programs and loan
guarantee programs results in a huge waste of scarce government re-
sources" (p. 147).
Economic Activities All Families Lowest 40% Highest 60%
Total number of families (‘000) 14,370.7 5,748.1 8,622.6
% reporting income from:
Wages and salaries 67.4 51.2 78.2
Family sustenance 50.1 74.2 34.2
Net share of crops, etc. 7.0 7.2 6.8
Entrepreneurial activities 61.2 70.0 55.5
Source of basic data: 1998 Annual Poverty Indicators Survey
Table 1. Sources of income by income group, 19983 No. 2001-01
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microfinance loan could initially be pegged at some nomi-
nal amount, say, P150,000. This is, at the current exchange
rate, just about equivalent to +US$3,000 which is the in-
ternational norm for the maximum amount of a
microfinance loan. The ceiling may be adjusted accordingly
as circumstances permit.
] Loans are based on informal information and pro-
jected cash flows. The calculation of the borrower’s ability
to pay is mainly based on his cash flow. Microfinance loans
are typically clean loans, that is, given without the tradi-
tional collateral. The microfinance lender takes comfort
from the projected cash flow and informal financial infor-
mation about the borrower. Peers or third parties normally
vouch for the borrower's creditworthiness and supply the
required information. Meanwhile, the experience of
microfinance institutions worldwide indicates that giving
borrowers flexibility in loan amortization is key to success-
ful loan repayment. Thus, microfinance loans may be am-
ortized on a daily, weekly, monthly or bimonthly basis, de-
pending on the cash flow condition of the borrower.
] Interest rates are market-based. Successful
microfinance institutions are those that charge market-
based interest rates.3 Interest rates on microfinance loans
should enable the lender to recover financial and opera-
tional costs and to generate a profit margin. Thus, interest
rates should not be lower than the prevailing market rates.
To require microfinance lenders to impose a much lower
rate is to constrain the sustainability of
microfinance operations.
National Strategy for Microfinance
In recognition of the potential role of
microfinance institutions in providing
microenterprises and small borrowers in
general access to deposit facilities and
loans, the National Credit Council (NCC) for-
mulated the National Strategy for
Microfinance in 1997. The Strategy called
on the government to create an appropriate
policy environment that will encourage more participation
by rural banks, credit cooperatives and credit-granting NGOs
in the delivery of microfinancial services to the basic sec-
tor. The National Strategy recognized the importance of
market-based microfinance and of creating a hospitable
policy environment.
The first step adopted by the government has been
to work for the dismantling of a number of subsidized credit
programs that compete with private initiative in microfinance.
Executive Order (EO) 138 issued in August 1999 directed
government nonfinancial agencies to stop their involvement
in direct lending and to use financial intermediaries instead
in providing loans to target sectors. EO 138 also provided
a phase-out schedule for subsidized credit programs in
the nonagriculture sector. It thus complements the Agricul-
ture and Fisheries Modernization Act (AFMA) of 1997 which
has earlier sought the phase out of all subsidized credit
programs in the agriculture sector and the creation of a
market-based financing mechanism for the sector.
The encouragement given to microfinance has moti-
vated a number of formal financial institutions, i.e., rural
banks, to venture into this field. Credit cooperatives are
also now becoming more active in it while credit-granting
NGOs which have been in this field much earlier than the
others are either now talking of expanding their operation
with donor funds provided for the purpose or converting
themselves into banks to be able to tap the deposit mar-
ket. __________
3The Latin American experience shows this. See Llanto (1999).
All Families Lowest 40% Highest 60%
Total number of families (‘000) 14,370.7 5,748.1 8,622.6
Number of families
with business (‘000) 8,497.7 3,880.5 4,617.1
Number of families with credit
to finance business (‘000) 2,145.9 926.4 1,219.5
Families with credit to finance
businesses (percent) 25.2 23.9 26.4
Source: 1998 Annual Poverty Indicators Survey
Table 2. Number of families availing of credit, 19984 January 2001
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A crucial component of the National Strategy is the
issue of having an appropriate regulatory framework for
microfinance institutions. Such a framework should en-
hance the efficiency and competitiveness of the financial
markets whose end beneficiaries will be the small-scale
borrowers of microfinance institutions. Appropriate regula-
tion and supervision should help ensure the financial vi-
ability and sustainability of microfinance institutions.
Regulation of microfinance banks
The Philippines has a variety of institutions involved
in the delivery of microfinancial services. These include
the rural banks, some private development banks, credit
and regulations and to establish the soundness of the
bank on the basis of procedures for loan approval, super-
vision and collection that would apply to traditional banks.
Since microfinance loans are typically given without collat-
eral, there is a risk that examiners will criticize banks mak-
ing such loans. This constrains the expansion of
microlending, much to the disadvantage of small-scale cli-
entele who need such loans.5
Microfinance in the General Banking Law
The enactment into law of the General Banking Law
of 2000 has brought microfinance into a new era.
Microfinance has now become part of mainstream bank-
ing in the country because of the explicit recognition given
to it by Sections 40, 41, 43 and 44 of the General Bank-
ing Law of 2000 or Republic Act 8791 which mandates
the Monetary Board to formulate appropriate rules and regu-
lations on microfinance operations.
Section 40 describes the information that may be
required by a bank for the grant of loans or other credit
accommodations such as a statement of assets and li-
abilities and of income and expenditure. The same sec-
tion also provides that “in formulating rules and regula-
tions under this Section, the Monetary Board shall recog-
nize the peculiar characteristics of microfinancing such as
cash flow-based lending to the basic sectors that are not
__________
4The Cooperative Development Authority (CDA), meanwhile, is the
regulatory authority for credit cooperatives. The credit-granting NGOs, on
the other hand, are not supervised by any organization. However, second-
tier organizations such as the Land Bank of the Philippines and the
People’s Credit and Finance Corporation maintain some sort of credit
supervisory authority over NGOs which borrow from them.
5There is hope that the regulatory attitude toward uncollateralized
microloans will change. The revised General Banking Act will pave the
way for an appropriate regulatory and supervisory treatment of
uncollateralized microenterprise loans. The BSP is also taking steps to
familiarize itself with microfinance. Two members of the Monetary Board,
the policymaking body of the BSP, and a managing director of the BSP
visited the Center for Agriculture and Rural Development (CARD) Rural
Bank in San Pablo City on March 30, 2000 to learn about that rural
bank’s experience with microfinance. The BSP is an active member of
the NCC and also a member of the Policy Advisory Group of the Coalition
for Microfinance Standards, a group of microfinance NGOs that is at-
tempting to develop performance standards for microfinance NGOs.
"A crucial component of the National
Strategy is the issue of having an appropriate
regulatory framework for microfinance
institutions. Such a framework should
enhance the efficiency and competitiveness
of the financial markets whose end
beneficiaries will be the small-scale
borrowers of microfinance institutions."
cooperatives and the microfinance NGOs. The Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) regulates and supervises the
banking system.4 Rural banks and other banks involved in
microfinance continue to be subject to BSP regulation and
supervision. On surface, there seems to be a working
framework for regulating and supervising microfinance
banks but a closer scrutiny reveals some inadequacies.
A 1997 study by the NCC, for instance, reported that
the BSP’s stance on small clean (unsecured) loans sup-
ported by informal information is not clear and, worse, vague
to banks subject to BSP supervision. Banking regulations
do not prohibit the grant of small clean loans. However, in
practice, there has been a traditional regulatory bias against
the grant by banks of loans with insufficient collateral or
without any form of security or collateral. BSP bank exam-
iners tend to check for compliance with banking laws, rules5 No. 2001-01
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covered by traditional collateral.” To this end, Section 41
authorizes the Monetary Board “to issue such regulations
as it may deem necessary with respect to unsecured loans
or other credit accommodations that may be granted to
banks.” Related to this is the provision under Section 44
regarding “the amortization on loans and other credit ac-
commodations” stating that “the amortization schedule of
bank loans and other credit accommodations shall be
adapted to the nature of the operations to be financed. . .
In case of loans and other credit accommodations to
microfinance sectors, the schedule of loan amortization
shall take into consideration the projected cash flow of the
borrower and adopt this into the terms and conditions for-
mulated by banks.”
The revised General Banking Law provides an excel-
lent opportunity to develop rules and supervisory practices
that are appropriate to microfinance banks. The
microfinance loan portfolio differs in a very significant way
from a conventional bank portfolio. An adequate apprecia-
tion of risks associated with microfinance loans, together
with the technical know-how on dealing with those risks,
would ensure that microlending is not unduly constrained.
Furthermore, the loan portfolio is the single most impor-
tant asset of a microfinance bank but this cannot be sim-
ply funded from public deposits unless there is appropri-
ate regulation and supervision to ensure the soundness
of the microfinance bank and the safety of those deposits.
On the other hand, under Section 43, “the Monetary
Board shall regulate the interest imposed on microfinance
borrowers by lending investors and similar lenders such
as, but not limited to, the unconscionable rates of interest
collected on salary loans and similar credit accommoda-
tions.” In this respect, the regulatory authority should ex-
ercise extreme care in regulating the interest rates because
a nonmarket rate will prevent recovering operational and
financial costs and realizing an adequate profit margin that
will be necessary for financial viability and sustainability.
To be able to have an effective set of rules and regu-
lations, an appropriate framework for banks involved in a
specialized field such as microfinance should be consid-
ered. And as suggested by this Policy Notes, this frame-
work is a risk-based supervision approach for microfinance
banks.
Risk-based supervision: a proposed approach
to microfinance
 Traditionally, the BSP and banks alike have concerned
themselves mainly with credit risk. However, a different
approach to bank supervision called “risk-based supervi-
sion” seems more appropriate for microfinance banks.
Risk-based supervision draws from a more comprehen-
sive understanding of risks faced by a microfinance bank.
The microfinance world presents a different environment
and structure of credit markets as may be gleaned from a
reading of the nature of the clientele, the microfinance loan
products and from the experience of successful
microfinance banks.6 The personal circumstances of the
clientele (poor, without bankable assets, with or without
basic education, among others), the use of informal finan-
cial information, and innovative lending and loan collection
techniques create different types of risks and show the
inadequacy of traditional prudential regulation and super-
vision approaches to deal with those risks.
Under the proposed approach to microfinance regu-
lation, the BSP, as the regulatory authority, should con-
sider a broader spectrum of risks affecting the microfinance
bank rather than be concerned with the lack of formal fi-
nancial information, documentation and loan collateral be-
__________
6Banco Solidaridad in Bolivia, Bank Rakyat Unit Desa in Indone-
sia and CARD Rural Bank in San Pablo City, Laguna, Philippines are
some examples of successful microfinance banks.
"...A different approach to bank supervision
called “risk-based supervision” seems more
appropriate for microfinance banks. Risk-
based supervision draws from a more
comprehensive understanding of risks faced
by a microfinance bank."6 January 2001
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hind microfinance loans. Some of the relevant risks in-
clude credit risk, liquidity risk, interest rate risk and trans-
action risk (Box 1).7 In this respect, the BSP can create a
risk profile of the microfinance bank and use this as refer-
ence for assessing its financial condition and performance
to anticipate and prevent systemic risk in the microfinancial
markets.
Key issues
What are the key issues or elements associated with
this proposed approach to microfinance?
] Asset quality, portfolio at risk and more aggres-
sive provisioning. To ensure asset quality, the microfinance
bank should focus on portfolio at risk and should have
more adequate loan loss provisioning than that required
of traditional banks. The latter does not mean, however, a
high provisioning for unsecured loans since the very na-
ture of microfinance loans is to provide such without the
traditional or conventional collateral. On the contrary, ad-
equate loan loss provisioning is predicated on a periodic
aging of loans past due and adopting a
portfolio at risk approach to loan portfolio
management.
Under the portfolio at risk approach,
a microfinance bank considers the entire
loan (principal and interest) at risk once a
loan amortization is missed one day after
due date.8 Through this approach, the
microfinance bank can be assured that the
quality of the loan portfolio is maintained.
Since microfinance loans are not provided
the usual loan collateral that can be cap-
tured by the lender upon default (collateral
substitutes such as third party guarantees,
peer pressure and moral suasion take the place of the
traditional collateral),9 the risk of rapid decapitalization due
to huge and rapid loan default is very great in microfinance
operations. Thus, a loan tracking mechanism that incorpo-
rates portfolio at risk as an indicator of performance is
critical. Without one in place, therefore, the concerned
microfinance bank should be prohibited from engaging in
microfinance operations.
A portfolio at risk approach will require the BSP to
check on the historical record of the loan portfolios and
draw a risk profile of the loan portfolio. Instead of using a
spot loan-by-loan review, the BSP will have to draw a sta-
tistical sample of past dues, analyze the reasons behind
the arrears and evaluate the adequacy of loan repayment
policies, among others. As in informal credit markets, timely
and reliable information is key to effective loan manage-
ment.
The financial statements may not necessarily pro-
vide accurate information on the actual condition of a bank
when there is failure to classify problem assets and provi-
sion for losses as well as to apply consistent charge-off or
write-off policies. Apparently, Philippine practice in this area
is deficient. Again, the 1997 NCC study mentioned earlier
revealed that there is no official or uniform charge-off or
write-off policy in the country. Banks are required to sub-
mit quarterly reports on loan charge-offs. The BSP uses
the ratio of loan charge-offs to the total loan portfolio as
__________
7These are some of the 9 different types of risks identified by Thomas
Fitzgerald, formerly of the Office of the Comptroller of Currency in the
United States that should be monitored under risk-based supervision.
8A loan is delinquent if loan repayment is one day past due date.
9For a discussion of collateral substitutes used in rural financial
markets in the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia, see Llanto and
others (1996).
v Credit risk exists when a bank is dependent upon another party to make or keep
the loans integral. On and off-balance sheet exposure creates credit risks for
banks.
v Liquidity risk arises when a bank has insufficient access to funds and is too
heavily dependent on limited sources of funding. Inability to meet deposit
withdrawals and loan requests and to liquidate assets without significant loss to
the bank constitutes liquidity risk.
v Transaction risk comes from problems associated with service or product deliv-
ery. This is also known as operating or operational risk. The accuracy and time-
liness of reports, presence of security controls, fraud prevention and fraud de-
tection measures are important elements of bank operation and the inad-
equacy of these measures creates transaction risk.
v Interest rate risk refers to the risks arising from the movement of interest rates
that affect the portfolios of financial institutions and from the inability to adjust
interest rates to changing economic and financial conditions.
Box 1. A broad spectrum of risks affecting microfinance banks7 No. 2001-01
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an indicator for its off-site supervision. However, while lend-
ing institutions determine when a loan is to be charged
off, the timing of the loan charge-off depends partly on its
effect on the bank’s capital position and the associated
tax effect. Thus, a loan charge-off could be postponed if it
will deplete capital that then triggers the need to bring in
more capital. If no new capital is in sight, then the loan
charge-off is deferred.
The tax angle also comes to the picture because
under the country’s tax rules, loans must first be charged
off before they are allowed as deduction for income tax
purposes. Thus, the timing of the charge-off is partly de-
termined by the tax avoidance process of banks and not
necessarily by the need to reflect their true financial condi-
tion. Clearly, the priority is to have a transparent charge-off
policy that considers the reflection of the bank’s true fi-
nancial condition as the paramount objective.
__________
10Mario Lamberte and Gilberto M. Llanto (1995).
11Polizatto (1990).
system will enable bank management and supervisors to
keep track of asset quality, capital adequacy and the li-
quidity position of microfinance banks. It will also be indis-
pensable for formulating an internal mechanism and set
of audit procedures for fraud prevention. The huge number
of microfinance clients and the daily turnover nature of the
operation ordains the need for effective fraud prevention
for the institution.
] Information disclosure and adequate account-
ing and auditing standards. Effective monitoring rests on
adequate information disclosure by the supervised
microfinance bank. Because of the BSP’s limited supervi-
sory resources, off-site surveillance is extremely neces-
sary. Adequate information disclosure is thus imperative.
Philippine banks generally adhere to the accepted account-
ing and auditing standards and thus provide information
that is reflective of their true financial condition.10 They
submit regular reports that can help supervisors gauge
their financial condition. However, the accounting and au-
diting standards must be strengthened. Standards to be
established include guidelines for asset classification,
stricter definition of past dues and nonperforming assets,
prohibition against capitalization of refinancing of interest
which is due and unpaid, reversal of previously accrued
but uncollected interest on nonperforming assets, and
adequate provision for actual or potential loan losses,
among others.11 It goes without saying that these stan-
dards should strictly apply to microfinance banks.
Policy recommendations
In conclusion and in view of the foregoing, this Policy
Notes recommends the following measures:
] Adopt a risk-based supervision approach for
microfinance banks.
] Allow microfinance banks to use informal infor-
mation, projected cash flows, and nonconventional collat-
eral in their client screening and loan approval process.
"Liquidity is the lifeblood of microfinance
operations and thus, the inability to track
loan performance on a daily basis constrains
the efficiency of the microfinance bank. An
adequate management information system
will enable bank management and
supervisors to keep track of asset quality,
capital adequacy and the liquidity position
of microfinance banks."
] Adequate management information system. The
BSP should require microfinance banks to have an adequate
management information system, including an effective
loan monitoring system that enables them to keep a daily
track of loan approvals and releases, collection, arrearages,
loan restructuring or refinancing, if any. Worldwide experi-
ence shows that microfinance lenders are very sensitive
to liquidity risk. Liquidity is the lifeblood of microfinance
operations and thus, the inability to track loan performance
on a daily basis constrains the efficiency of the
microfinance bank. An adequate management information8 January 2001
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] Allow microfinance banks to charge market-based
interest rates.
] Define microfinance clients and operations in the
BSP circular that will implement the microfinance provisions
of the revised General Banking Law.
] Require microfinance banks to use “portfolio at
risk” to monitor asset quality.
] Require microfinance banks to have an adequate
management information system.
] Impose transparent financial accounting and re-
porting standards on microfinance banks.  4 4
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